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Abstract
Informed voting is costly: research shows that voters use heuristics such as party 
identification and retrospection to make choices that approximate enlightened deci-
sion-making. Most of this work, however, focuses on high-information races and 
ignores elections in which these cues are often unavailable (e.g. primary, local). In 
these cases, citizens are on their own to search for quality information and evalu-
ate it efficiently. To assess how voters navigate this situation, we field three survey 
experiments asking respondents what information they want before voting. We eval-
uate respondents on their ability to both acquire and utilize information in a way that 
improves their chances of voting for quality candidates, and how this varies by the 
sophistication of respondents and the offices sought by candidates. We find strong 
evidence that voters use “deal-breakers” to quickly eliminate undesirable candidates; 
however, the politically unsophisticated rely on unverifiable, vague, and irrelevant 
search considerations. Moreover, less sophisticated voters also rely on more per-
sonalistic considerations. The findings suggest that voters’ search strategies may be 
ineffective at identifying the best candidates for office, especially at the local level.
Keywords Information search · Heuristics · Local elections · Nonpartisan elections · 
Primaries
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Scholars of public opinion broadly accept that when American citizens venture to 
the polls to vote for president, they bring to bear something far less than the full 
range of candidate information publicly available (Achen and Bartels 2017, pp. 
1–4). The average voter is often too preoccupied with the demands of daily life 
to pay attention to the intricacies of a campaign. Though this behavior appears to 
pose a challenge to obtaining good representation, scholars argue that heuristics 
allow voters to use a very limited amount of knowledge to cast an as-if-informed 
vote (Gigerenzer et al. 1999; Lau and Redlawsk 2001a). In high-profile presidential 
elections, voters likely carry key cues, such as the candidates’ partisan affiliation or 
endorsements received, with them into the voting booth. What happens, however, in 
the case of local, non-partisan, or primary elections? How do voters search for infor-
mation about candidates in these comparatively low-information environments, and 
how does this search process impact the quality of their decision-making?
If voters know little about even many presidential candidates, the information 
environment for races like county comptroller is likely magnitudes worse (cf. Oliver 
and Ha 2007). In these situations, a voter may know nothing other than the can-
didates’ names, and then only because they are printed on the ballot. A sense of 
civic duty may compel voters to attempt to make an informed choice, but every voter 
has competing demands on their time (Downs 1957, p. 139). In this circumstance, 
many of us may conduct a brief Google search on our smartphone or leaf through a 
voter guide to determine our vote. Yet however commonplace this scenario is, little 
research examines this stage of the voting process (Lau et al. 2018).
Deficiencies in voters’ search strategies could diminish the quality of representa-
tion in several possible ways (Redlawsk 2004), yet scant research examines whether 
voters search for information that predicts actual job performance. For instance, the 
criteria they choose to base their decision on may be irrelevant to the duties of the 
office, impossible to verify in a short amount of time, or too generalized to produce 
useful information. While more interested and more knowledgeable voters may be 
more likely to conduct thorough, “rational choice”-style searches (Lau et al. 2018), 
not all voters will.
We conduct a simple set of experiments to explore how voters search for informa-
tion. We pose a fictional candidate to survey respondents and randomize the offices 
candidates run for (including both high-profile positions like president and gover-
nor, as well as local offices like mayor, comptroller, clerk, and judge). We then ask 
respondents in open-ended questions what information they would want in order to 
cast an informed vote for that candidate, and how their likelihood of voting for him 
or her changes depending on whether they find the new information encouraging or 
disappointing. From the resulting data, we evaluate the content and quality of the 
information desired by respondents, as well as their ability to request information 
that efficiently winnows the list of acceptable candidates. We focus on how these 
things vary by both the sophistication of respondents and the office being consid-
ered. While our approach is not without drawbacks, we believe it largely mirrors 
the experience of the average voter searching for information about a long list of 
obscure candidates.
In these three survey experiments, which utilize the same design across differ-
ent samples, we find evidence that respondents are informationally efficient. After 
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requesting information, voters employ what we call a “deal-breaker” heuristic, in 
which they evaluate whether candidates from a list meet their most important cri-
terion, and harshly penalize those who do not. In contrast, respondents only slowly 
warm to candidates who meet the criteria. However, this apparently good news for 
democracy comes with a caveat: the actual information that citizens seek out varies 
greatly depending on the voter’s political knowledge and education. Sophisticated 
respondents make “good” information requests that are relevant to the office, verifi-
able through a brief search, specific enough to reveal something useful, and focused 
on candidates’ politics and/or experience; less sophisticated voters are more likely to 
ask questions that are irrelevant, unverifiable, and vague, especially regarding candi-
dates for lesser known offices.
Moreover, citizens belonging to political demographics that typically lack polit-
ical knowledge are almost as likely to search for characteristics of the candidates 
themselves, such as their age, religion, or perceived personality traits (“likeable,” 
“speaks his mind”) as they are to search for policy or political cues like endorse-
ments. In other words, the informed look for programmatic representatives, while 
the uninformed look for personalistic representatives. Such findings pose new con-
cerns about citizens’ ability to obtain good representation. Some candidates may 
be able to win elections despite poor performance in (or qualification for) office by 
playing up likeable aspects of their personality and life.
Searching for Quality Representation
To obtain good political representation, citizens must possess information with 
which they are able to discriminate between desirable and undesirable candidates, 
and if they lack this information, they must ask good questions to acquire it.1 While 
our project focuses primarily on information search strategies (how the information 
is acquired and used), the information content voters seek out will also vary based 
on what they believe to be “good” representation. Although many kinds of repre-
sentation are possible (Pitkin 1967), we focus here on substantive representation, 
or congruence between the policies desired by constituents and those pursued by 
the representative.2 Given the consensus among normative theorists that substantive 
1 Voters must also know how to effectively process and utilize this information, a skill lacking even 
amongst the knowledgeable, as argued by Cramer and Toff (2017).
2 Perhaps the clearest consequence of our focus on substantive representation is obscuring voters’ desire 
for descriptive representation—the congruence between the demographic characteristics of the represent-
ative and the represented (Pitkin 1967). Of course, given the underrepresentation of women and minor-
ities, especially at higher offices, it would be reasonable for concerned voters to prioritize descriptive 
representation of such groups. Scholars typically argue that descriptive representation is valuable to the 
extent that someone like them is more likely to pursue their key substantive goals, or to the extent that 
having a fellow group member in office secures symbolic benefits for the group. A descriptively congru-
ent representative, for instance, may be more likely to represent in the way Mansbridge (2003) refers 
to as gyroscopic—pursuing what constituents desire because it is what they themselves desire. In real 
life, however, voters may face tradeoffs between descriptive and substantive representation (Mansbridge 
1999; Dovi 2002). Some evidence suggests in-group members choose substantive over descriptive repre-
sentation, given a conflict between the two (Lerman and Sadin 2016).
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representation lies at the heart of high-functioning democracy, when we evalu-
ate whether citizens are able to search out information that allows them to secure 
“good” political representation, we assume that good representation means substan-
tive representation. Throughout, we consider substantive representation to mean 
both programmatic or ideological representation on issues, but also—in the case of 
local offices that may not be “programmatic,” but instead technocratic—competent 
execution of office responsibilities. What information, then, would voters need to 
assess whether a candidate represents their substantive interests?
Voters’ Information Search: Strategies and Content
Scholars widely regard the high cost to voters of acquiring full information as an 
impediment to democratic accountability. The vast majority of the evidence, dating 
back to at least Berelson et al. (1954), suggests that most individuals fall short of 
fully informed, fully rational voting behavior. Instead, our behavior reveals that we 
are cognitive misers attempting to maximize the utility of the limited information we 
do have while avoiding the time-consuming search needed to enact a fully informed 
vote (e.g., Conover and Feldman 1984, 1989; Redlawsk 2004; Lau et al. 2018).
Given this reality, the political science literature on heuristics examines the strat-
egies by which voters attempt to approximate full information given limited infor-
mation. While some research finds that heuristics work very well (Lupia 1994), 
and others show they work very poorly (Bartels 1996), most studies tend to fall 
somewhere in the middle. Certain types of strategies, such as “take-the-best” or 
“minimalist” heuristics, seem to work well (Gigerenzer et al. 1999), especially when 
aggregated across individuals (Kuklinski and Quirk 2000; Gilens 2011), and in cer-
tain conditions, such as when there are few candidates with clear positions (Lau and 
Redlawsk 1997). Take-the-best, in particular, requires a decision between only two 
alternatives, and prior knowledge about those alternatives on a number of criteria 
considered important to the individual.
The literature on heuristics thus stands in contrast to much of the research on 
vote choice in that it focuses on voter efficiency, rather than information content; 
the latter attempts to identify the characteristics of candidates—their past perfor-
mance, policy platforms, and personal qualities—that carry the greatest weight in 
voters’ minds. Many studies find that candidates’ personal traits predict both vot-
ers’ assessments of the candidates and candidates’ eventual electoral success (Miller 
et al. 1986; Funk 1997, 1999). Others have found that demographic characteristics 
seem to influence voter attitudes towards candidates (Goggin working paper), and 
some traits, such as gender, may moderate which other traits are considered impor-
tant (Ditonto 2016; Ditonto et al. 2014). Still others find little relationship between 
the traits respondents claim matter and the traits that predict votes, except for incum-
bent presidents (Kinder et al. 1980). Respondents frequently have trouble identify-
ing where candidates stand on specific issues (Freeder et  al. 2018), especially in 
low-salience or local elections, ensuring little academic consensus on whether and 
how issues matter to all but the most informed voters. Finally, voters do seem to care 
about past performance, termed “retrospective voting,” though this literature is too 
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voluminous to address in detail here (see Healy and Malhotra 2013 for review). Yet 
we know little about how retrospective voting operates at the local level, especially 
given the comparative difficulty of assessing the performance of more technocratic 
and nonpartisan offices.3
Unsurprisingly, many studies find that voters’ political sophistication and edu-
cation affects both the content sought (Pierce 1993 is one exception) and the pro-
cess by which voters sort through the information available (Lau et al. 2018). While 
early analyses of voting behavior argued that educated voters should be less con-
cerned with candidates’ personal attributes, Glass (1985) and Miller et  al. (1986) 
find the opposite to be true. Funk (1997) finds that only sophisticated voters pre-
fer candidate competence (a personal trait linked to job performance) to warmth. 
Similarly, Gomez and Wilson (2001) find that more sophisticated voters are more 
capable of retrospective voting. Sophistication not only affects the content of voters’ 
opinions, but how they form those opinions. Lau and Redlawsk (2001a) find that 
more sophisticated voters better use heuristics; likewise, McGraw and Pinney (1990) 
and Krosnick and Milburn (1990) show that political sophistication (general and 
domain-specific, and objective and subjective, respectively) matters to information 
acquisition and opinion formation. More pointedly, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1993) 
state that “factual knowledge is the best single indicator of sophistication” (p. 1180), 
and moderates a large number of attitudinal and behavioral outcomes of interest. In 
short, “all things being equal, the more informed people are, the better able they are 
to perform as citizens” (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, p. 219). As with the vote 
choice literature, however, little work examines whether voter sophistication also 
affects decision-making about local candidates, and to our knowledge, there is no 
scholarship examining whether it affects information acquisition strategies.
Voting with a Blank Slate
Despite behaviorists’ emphasis on the costs of acquiring full information, the topic 
of information search is curiously understudied (Lau and Redlawsk 2001b; Redlawsk 
2004), especially at the very origins of the search process. This is an unfortunate 
omission given that the vast majority of elections are low-information, low-salience 
races in which many voters start with little more than names and office titles on a 
ballot (cf. Oliver and Ha 2007). Nor is it obvious that voters search only for politi-
cal or programmatic information; the most frequent Google search terms associated 
with the names of the 2016 presidential candidates are “age” and “height” (Kaplan 
2015).
3 The key question for the current project is whether voters know enough about even the functions of 
such offices to make retrospective considerations. Although we do not report the results in the main 
body of the paper, we show in SI Sect. 1.4 that, for all the offices we pose to respondents, a majority 
of respondents successfully identify key responsibilities of the office in question, suggesting that many 
voters can indeed engage in local retrospective voting, should they so choose. Nonetheless, due to con-
siderations of length, we do not examine here how frequently voters engage in retrospective voting at the 
local level.
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Earlier scholarly work on the determinants of vote choice, such as partisanship, 
generally operates under the assumption that some usable information for each 
determinant is available to the voter.4 Such work thus assumes that voters have been 
exposed to information, and attempts to understand the effects of this exposure on 
voters’ decisions. We ask a different question: how will voters acquire and evalu-
ate information if they know absolutely nothing about the candidates, apart from 
their names and the offices they seek? We believe this is essential to ask when, more 
frequently than we may wish to admit, we open our ballots to find we must select a 
comptroller or city clerk, let alone a myriad of other offices that vary idiosyncrati-
cally based on one’s location—transit director, county commissioner, dogcatcher, 
tree warden, fence viewer (all real elected positions in the U.S.), et cetera. Rather 
than focus on determinants of vote choice, we explore (1) what information vot-
ers search for before making a choice, (2) how relevant, specific, and verifiable the 
information sought is, and (3) how voters’ searches change as they learn more.
To our knowledge, no studies examine how voters execute this first stage of the 
information search. What information do voters want to have, as might be discov-
ered in a quick Internet search or provided by a voter guide, to make a reasona-
bly informed choice about these candidates? Do voters execute careful and precise 
searches? Further, what purpose does that information serve? Is the search used 
to create a lushly detailed picture of the candidates, as required for fully informed 
voting (e.g., by funnel theories of voting behavior: Campbell et  al. 1960; Miller 
et al. 1996)? Or does it function as a heuristic to quickly sort candidates into “still 
acceptable” and “immediately unacceptable” bins? The evidence in favor of cogni-
tive miserliness suggests the latter is a more likely use of each piece of information, 
especially in low-salience elections; we refer to this approach as the “deal-breaker” 
heuristic throughout.5 We expect voters conducting quick searches in low-salience 
elections to form snap judgments by applying this heuristic to the information at 
5 We consider this heuristic conceptually distinct from other heuristic strategies, such as “take-the-
best” or “fast and frugal” (Gigerenzer et al. 1999, 2008), for two reasons. First, take-the-best is meant 
for quickly choosing between two alternatives, while the deal-breaker heuristic we describe is often or 
even typically used in situations involving more than two alternatives. Second, take-the-best assumes the 
individual possesses prior knowledge about each alternative, then recalls from memory the most impor-
tant information and looks for discriminating characteristics among them; we propose that voters employ 
the deal-breaker heuristic when they possess no prior knowledge on desired topics, and must instead 
choose the topics that they believe are both important and will allow them to eliminate at least some 
options. Recent work on information search and voting refers to what we call deal-breaking as “heuristic-
based decision-making,” but we view this label as insufficiently precise, as distinct types of heuristics 
(minimalist, take-the-best, fast and frugal, etc.) would result in different types of search strategies--for 
instance, in shallow but comparable searches vs. non-comparable searches (see Lau et al. 2018, p. 4). For 
succinct conceptual definitions of take-the-best and fast and frugal heuristics, see Gigerenzer and Gaiss-
meier (2011).
4 This scholarship faces a unique challenge: any consideration that seems to play a minor role in vote 
choice—for instance, issue opinions—may appear to be unimportant either because citizens are uninter-
ested in evaluating their candidates on that basis, or because they lack the necessary information to do so. 
Despite this problem, most experiments examine voting behavior by manipulating either specific types of 
information about candidates—partisanship, policy stances, demographic characteristics, and so on—to 
assess their relative importance, or altering the presentation of those cues (such as with a prose vignette, 
photo, or video) to examine whether voters are sensitive to the medium.
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hand, rather than online or memory-based processing, which presumes exposure to 
information over a non-trivial amount of time (Lodge et  al. 1989; McGraw et  al. 
1990).6
Empirical Strategy
We assess here what types of information voters seek in order to select candidates 
and how efficiently they are able to seek it. To do so, we recruited respondents to 
participate in a brief survey in three separate instances between February and 
December 2016. Respondents in Studies 1 and 3 were drawn from Mechanical Turk, 
in Study 2 through Survey Sampling International, and tallied to 3678 in total. Sur-
vey designs differed in small ways, but largely used the same format (for full details 
on individual studies, see SI Sect. 1.1). Respondents across all studies were asked 
about demographics, media usage, and given a political knowledge battery.7
In each survey, respondents were presented with a hypothetical candidate for 
office. We manipulated the office sought, as we had little sense for how tailored 
information requests might be for specific offices. Respondents were randomly told 
that the candidate was running for one of four local races—mayor, clerk, comptrol-
ler, judge—or governor or presidential primary.
Each respondent was then asked to request, using an open-ended text box, what-
ever information they felt they would need most to cast an informed vote for or 
against them.8 For each candidate, each respondent repeated this procedure three 
times, to generate three information requests. A typical set of responses from a sin-
gle person might thus look something like “stance on taxes,” “where they’re from,” 
and “corrupt or honest.” To turn these responses into quantitative data, we employed 
two student assistants to evaluate them using a coding scheme we created that cate-
gorized responses according to the type of content requested, and then by the quality 
of the search. The coding scheme is described in the next section.
After giving us their three information requests, each respondent in Studies 1 and 
3 was randomly assigned to one of four conditions, in which they were presented 
6 We stress that this process applies only to candidates about whom the voters knows nothing before 
seeing their name on the ballot; the search process likely operates quite differently in high-profile races, 
where early information about candidates will not be self-sought but instead provided by the media.
7 We provide detailed information on the political knowledge batteries in SI Sect. 1.4. In the main paper, 
we use a five-item political knowledge battery per Delli Carpini and Keeter (1993), which is broadly 
understood to correlate with political interest (further mediated through media coverage), as well as edu-
cation levels, which mediate uptake of the knowledge available (Jerit et al. 2006). While it was not pos-
sible to measure media coverage of a hypothetical candidate for office, we do also present evidence that 
using education levels (SI 3.1) or knowledge of local offices (SI 3.2) as the independent variable rather 
than political knowledge, provides similar results.
8 Our hope was that an open-ended text box most closely replicates the process of searching for informa-
tion online, with the secondary advantage that we avoid putting ideas in the heads of our respondents. If 
asked to choose from a list of information about a candidate, the respondent might be confronted with 
many pieces of information (e.g., specific policy positions or candidate qualities) that they might other-
wise never consider themselves.
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with a hypothetical situation where they found information about one of the pieces 
of information they requested.9 Half were told that the information they found was 
generally “disappointing,” the other half “encouraging”; half were randomized to 
see the first piece of information they requested, while the other half saw the last 
piece of information. By doing this, we left it up to the respondents to determine 
what constituted a “disappointing” or “encouraging” response to a given request. 
All respondents were then asked how this disclosure would affect their willingness 
to vote for that candidate using a five-point scale ranging from “certain to vote for/
against” (depending on the condition) to “no effect.”10
This procedure allows us to assess three separate aspects of the voter information 
search: search content, search quality, and search efficiency. We take this “breadth” 
approach simply because the topic of information search is so understudied, and 
because we are the first to our knowledge to study it at the local level. Rather than 
proceed study-by-study, we present results grouped by each of the three aspects of 
the information search. As such, the paper provides individual hypotheses and meth-
ods together with the results for each section in turn. First, we describe the content 
of the information respondents requested. Second, we develop a new set of crite-
ria for categorizing voters’ searches as likely to improve their ability to make an 
informed choice between the candidates. Finally, we determine whether voters uti-
lize the information discovered to quickly winnow a list of candidates. For each of 
these three concerns, we evaluate whether respondents’ strategies vary depending on 
their level of political sophistication and the type of office sought by the candidates. 
By doing so, we allow for the possibility that politicians are less likely to be held 
accountable under certain conditions, some of which we anticipate to be prevalent at 
the local level.
Information Search Content
Given the lack of scholarship on this topic, we first explore what information people 
claim they want in order to make an informed vote choice. We expect the content 
of the information sought to depend on both the sophistication of the voters and the 
type of office sought by the candidates. This content should vary both because of 
what voters know (and often do not know) about these positions, and because of the 
nature of the jobs themselves. While higher offices are explicitly political and pro-
grammatic, many at the local level are narrowly technical, inviting a different set of 
considerations.
9 We emphasize that we did not provide respondents with actual information regarding their request. 
Doing so would require us not only to anticipate all possible types of information requests, but also make 
assumptions about whether individual respondents would respond to a given revelation positively or neg-
atively.
10 We assume that respondents would never react to disappointing information with increased likelihood 
of voting for the candidate, or vice versa.
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Content Coding
As described in the “Empirical Strategy” section, each response was converted to 
a three-digit code for quantitative analysis. Each code is concatenated such that 
the first number corresponds to a major category, while the second and third num-
bers correspond to subcategories. The major categories include Political Infor-
mation, Policy Information (either specific policies or general interest), Muta-
ble Characteristics, Immutable Characteristics, and Other. The authors resolved 
all differences in coding categories manually. Basic descriptions are outlined in 
Table 1; for an exhaustive list of coding categories, please see SI Sect. 1.2. All 
analyses in this section report p-values from two-tailed t tests of the difference of 
means.
Results
What do voters claim they want to know about candidates? Figure 1 shows the 
relative frequency of different types of information requests by office. Policy 
Information (“specific” and “general”) is by far the most commonly requested 
type. Searches for “specific” information reference individual issues (e.g. “how 
he’ll deal with rising crime”); “general” policy searches are performance-related 
queries that do not reference particular issues (e.g. “what she’ll do to help us”). 
Requests about the candidate’s political affiliations and about their personal life 
and individual characteristics also were quite common. The least used category 
Table 1  Coding Scheme and Examples
Category Examples of Content
Political Ideology: “is she a liberal”
Partisan affiliation: “Democrat,” “political affiliation”
Endorsements: “is he a union man”
Policy General: “economic plans,” “track record on social issues,” “main 
objectives”
Specific: “unemployment,” “do they support LGBTQ,” “city transit 
planning”
Experience: “previously worked in government”
Mutable characteristics Personality/traits: “is she a liar,” “how trustworthy,” “bold,” “sanity”
Education: “college degree”
Family: “is he married/kids”
Background/general: “neighborhood,” “personal life,” “his or her story”
Immutable characteristics Age: “how old is she”
Race: “where are her people from/is she ethnic”
Gender: “gender”
Religion: “believes in Jesus”
Other Incoherent/nonsensical: “bdrtrfsg,” “NA,” “I would fix everything as 
mayor”
Unable to categorize: “background,” “who is it”
612 Political Behavior (2020) 42:603–623
1 3
was Immutable Characteristics, indicating that explicit attention to (or willing-
ness to express interest in) gender, age, race and other such categories was quite 
low. Few requests fell into Other; these consisted primarily of unintelligible or 
unserious responses, and the remainder typically involved one-word references to 
“background,” which might mean either the politician’s record, personal charac-
teristics, or their preparation for office, and thus could not be classified.
There are clear differences in information requests by office. Political informa-
tion requests (party, ideology, and endorsements) are consistent across offices.11 
Requests for both specific and general policy information increase as the level of 
the office increases, suggesting that voters may either care more about or be more 
familiar with national and party-driven policy topics (e.g., immigration) than local 
policy topics (e.g., police hiring). Experience-related information requests decrease 
as the level of office increases, perhaps because voters assume that someone running 
for governor or president must have relevant prior experience. Requests centered on 
immutable characteristics stay about the same, though mutable requests are more 
common in local than national races (two-tailed t test, p < 0.001). “Other” requests 
are higher for the lowest-level offices, either because individuals were likelier to 
Fig. 1  Types of request by office. Each row shows the share of information requests for a given office. All 
rows sum to 100. The number of requests made by each office, top to bottom: 1308, 1294, 1299, 7830, 
348, 326 (total = 12,045). Randomization details can be found in SI Sect. 1.1
11 Requests for political information are low for president because respondents were told this was a pres-
idential primary candidate of their own party.
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simply ask about candidates’ “background” or because voters did not know enough 
about relevant policy to ask policy-related questions.
These results paint an arguably optimistic picture of the electorate. Respondents 
report prioritizing political and policy information over factors like race and gender, 
and domain experience over policy where appropriate (i.e. for local administrative 
positions). On the other hand, as offices became more obscure, voters were more 
likely to ask general policy questions and questions about the candidates’ personali-
ties. This may indicate that respondents are less capable of quickly assessing candi-
dates’ qualifications in lower-profile races. We assume these results reflect at least 
some social desirability bias by respondents. If true, our findings likely overestimate 
the use of policy considerations, and underestimate reliance on partisan cues and 
immutable characteristics of the candidates.
Per Fig. 2, we see clear changes in the content respondents ask for as respondents 
become more politically knowledgeable.12 Respondents become much more likely 
to request information like endorsements, experience, and specific programmatic 
stances (both prospective, in the sense of the candidate’s agenda, and retrospective, 
in the sense of the candidate’s record on a given issue) as they became more politi-
cally knowledgeable. However, the less knowledgeable respondents were, the more 
Fig. 2  Request content by respondent political knowledge. Percentages are calculated by knowledge level 
(i.e., the bars for those who answered zero political knowledge questions correctly sum to 100 across all 
seven plots). 1260 requests were made by respondents answered zero questions correctly, 2156 requests 
by those with one correct, 1741 requests by those with two correct, 1852 requests by those with three 
correct, 2087 requests by those with four correct, and 2589 requests were made by those who answered 
all five political knowledge questions correctly
12 In SI Sect. 2.1, we also provide a breakdown of the content requests by both office and respondent 
political knowledge.
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likely they were to make personalistic requests (about both mutable and immuta-
ble characteristics of the candidates), as well as to make requests filed as “Other” 
(which includes both responses like “background,” which could not be classified, or 
responses that misunderstand or blow off the assignment). We see the same patterns 
when we use voter education (see SI Sect.  2.2) or local office-specific knowledge 
(see SI Sect.  2.3). Knowledgeable voters report looking for good representatives, 
while less knowledgeable voters report looking for good people.
Information Search Quality
In addition to searching for different content, less sophisticated citizens should be 
more likely to conduct searches that are misleading or unhelpful. We define searches 
to be misleading in the sense that they do not allow the voter to unequivocally ascer-
tain whether the candidate offers them good substantive representation, not in the 
sense that the information obtained is factually untrue. We consider information 
searches to be suboptimal if they rely on unverifiable, vague, or irrelevant questions. 
If a large percentage of the public relies upon misleading information when deciding 
between low-profile candidates, this may be worse than choosing officials at random. 
For instance, if voters search for candidates’ age and height, per Kaplan (2015), they 
may inadvertently select less ideologically congruent candidates who look appealing 
on those characteristics.
Search Quality Coding
In order to evaluate the quality of the searches, we build on the previous coding 
scheme by assessing how likely each search is to help voters identify good repre-
sentatives. We posit three qualities we associate with suboptimal information search 
strategies:
• Irrelevant Information should be predictive of representative performance or 
policy. Some information, such as height, we argue is politically irrelevant. Other 
information is contextually irrelevant, as in the example of selecting a comptrol-
ler on the basis of her position on abortion.13
• Unverifiable Some information might be useful, but impossible to fairly ascer-
tain without extensive over-time observation. For instance, though honesty is 
surely a valuable candidate trait, it is difficult to imagine that trustworthiness can 
13 We acknowledge that citizens could potentially be justified in seeking ideological information about 
candidates for non-ideological offices. For instance, if voters see such offices as a springboard to higher 
office, some may want to eliminate ideologically divergent candidates early in their political careers. 
Other voters may be aware that some offices do touch on the ideological; Kentucky clerk Kim Davis’ 
refusal to provide marriage licenses to gay couples is one such example. Thus, we include all politi-
cal requests as relevant for all offices. But we restrict the policy requests considered relevant based on 
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be assessed from a voter guide blurb or campaign materials, short of a guilty ver-
dict in a trial.
• Vague Knowing “[the candidate’s] background” or “how they’ll improve the 
city” is ideal in theory, but as search terms these questions are unlikely to reveal 
detailed information. Vague or broad questions may thus limit voters’ ability to 
identify the candidate that best matches their ideological preferences, and rein-
force candidate preferences for delivering platitudes over taking stands.
We then code each of the content categories for whether they appear consistent 
with each of the above criteria. Searches were coded as 1 if they appeared to match 
the criterion (e.g., relevant) and 0 if not; a full account of the coding scheme can 
be found in SI Sect.  1.3. We attempted to be as generous as possible in our cod-
ing so as not to discredit unduly valid searches. Each information request is coded 
independently, and thus can appear as any combination of values (e.g., a search may 
be relevant and specific, but unverifiable). We analyze the relationship between 
these search quality variables and political knowledge using simple bivariate OLS 
regressions, and differences across offices using t-tests for difference of means (e.g., 
between local offices and higher offices).
Results
Which voters are able to ask “good” questions? The quality of the information 
search is not universal across respondents. Rather, as we previously argued, the 
ability to ask “good” (verifiable, specific, and relevant) questions varies depending 
on the respondent’s sophistication. In Fig.  3, the x-axis depicts performance on a 
five-question political knowledge battery, where zero means that the respondent got 
none of the questions right, and one that they got every question right. The y-axis 
shows how likely a given request was to fall into a particular category, where (for 
example) zero means that no respondents asked vague questions, and one means that 
every question asked by someone at that level of political knowledge was vague. As 
political knowledge increases, one’s propensity to ask irrelevant (B = − 0.101, two-
tailed t test p < 0.001), unverifiable (B = − 0.139, p < 0.001), and vague (B = − 0.056, 
p = 0.017) questions decreases. On average, for each additional political knowledge 
question answered correctly, respondents are about ten percentage points (10.26%) 
less likely to request information that falls into one of these categories. The results 
are similar but slightly weaker if one uses educational attainment instead of politi-
cal knowledge (see SI Sect. 3.1). The results are much stronger when we use our 
measure of knowledge of local offices (asked in Study 2 only) instead of the general 
political knowledge battery (see SI Sect.  3.2).14 Finally, given our hypothesis that 
14 We asked a battery of local political knowledge questions (e.g., does the mayor have the ability to hire 
city employees?) on Study 2 due to two concerns. First, we worried that typical political knowledge batteries, 
which focus on national offices and events, might overstate voters’ knowledge about local offices. Second, 
Ahler and Goggin (NP) report concerns that typical political knowledge batteries are too easy and too famil-
iar (e.g., “who is president?), reducing variation in the variable of interest. As predicted, we find our results 
are even stronger with the local knowledge battery. We provide and interpret our results in SI Sect. 3.2.
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Fig. 3  Request by respondent political knowledge. Each line represents the relationship between requests 
and knowledge using a simple bivariate OLS regression. Specifically, the lines indicate the frequency 
with which a search request (total number of requests = 8472) meets the given criteria as the political 
knowledge of the requester increases. This figure reflects data pooled across Studies 1 and 3 only, as we 
used a different measure of political knowledge in Study 2. A version of this figure for Study 2 is avail-
able in SI Sect. 3.2
15 Moreover, when aggregating across all requests made by an individual, we find that the base rates 
of each “unhelpful” type of search increase by 20–25%, with 80% of low knowledge and 65% of high 
knowledge respondents asking at least one unhelpful question (see SI Sect. 3.4). In SI Sect. 2.4, we show 
that less politically knowledgeable respondents are also less likely to report needing additional informa-
tion to make a vote decision than high-knowledge respondents, and discuss the potential explanations for 
this finding.
voters will prioritize the information most important to their decision-making, we 
also check that the results hold when we only examine the first search request, and 
find that they do (see SI Sect. 3.3).
Respondents are not equally adept at asking good questions about the lesser 
known local offices (comptroller, clerk, judge); relative to requests for mayor, gov-
ernor, or president, the base rate of unverifiable requests jumps by 15% across all 
knowledge groups, 20% for irrelevant requests, and 10% for vague requests (see SI 
Sect. 3.5 for a version of Fig. 3 separated out by offices). Furthermore, high and low 
knowledge respondents are equally likely to ask vague questions about local candi-
dates, suggesting that even the very politically attentive have trouble understanding 
what they should know about obscure offices.15
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Information Search Efficiency
Finally, we evaluate whether people can use heuristics efficiently when they must 
acquire information. A heuristic’s value is determined not by its substantive rele-
vance to the voter, but rather its ability to assist the voter in maximizing the certainty 
of selecting the candidate they would “truly” prefer given full information (to “vote 
correctly,” per Lau and Redlawsk 1997). Given a long list of unknown candidates, 
we hypothesize that it is more efficient to eliminate candidates from consideration 
based on the discovery of a single undesirable quality than it is to commit to candi-
dates after confirming their desirability on a large range of items.
Throughout, we call this the “deal-breaker” heuristic. An efficient information 
search using this heuristic looks something like a game of “Guess Who”: the voter 
attempts to reveal highly undesirable qualities about the candidates, eliminates those 
who possess them, and repeats this process until one viable candidate remains.16
In high-profile elections, partisan affiliation may be the only cue most voters 
need, but this is less true in low-profile races, for several reasons: a party label 
is useless in party primary elections; local elections are often non-partisan; and 
the responsibilities of local elected officials are often orthogonal to partisanship, 
as these roles emphasize administrative and technical ability above ideological 
vision. As such, a discerning voter facing these conditions must determine and 
search for additional criteria before feeling certain that a candidate deserves her 
support.
If voters use the deal-breaker heuristic as described, we should observe sev-
eral behaviors. When a voter learns about a candidate, he or she should react more 
strongly to negative information than to positive information (Kahneman and Tver-
sky 1979). In other words, we expect they will be more certain they won’t vote for 
a candidate who disappoints them than they will feel certain to vote for a candidate 
who pleases them. Second, efficient voters should search for higher-priority infor-
mation first. The combination means that discouraging results yielded from infor-
mation sought initially should produce greater certainty that the candidate should 
be rejected than the discouraging results yielded from information sought later, but 
encouraging information about candidates discovered early should produce only a 
little more certainty about voting for a candidate than information sought later. We 
assess this hypothesis using a t-test of difference of means between experimental 
conditions.
16 This would create an information search asymmetry in most races: voters will know much less about 
candidates they quickly eliminate than candidates who meet that criteria. In other words, voters will learn 
much more about a candidate who exhausts their search preferences–the candidate they select–than their 
opponent(s). This prediction, though outside the scope of the present study, runs directly counter to most 
accounts of voting behavior, which presume that voters know the stances of all candidates on the criteria 
used to make a vote decision.
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Results
Do voters prioritize information that lets them eliminate unsuitable candidates 
quickly? We find evidence that citizens make use of a “deal-breaker” heuristic when 
searching for political information about candidates. Recall that we earlier predicted 
that citizens should react with more certainty about their vote when they learn some-
thing bad about a candidate than something good, and that they should prioritize 
finding deal-breakers at the beginning of their information search. This is precisely 
what we find, shown in Fig. 4. The x-axis shows respondents’ certainty about their 
vote, with one signaling they “definitely would” (when shown encouraging informa-
tion) or “definitely would not” (when shown discouraging information) vote for the 
candidate after receiving this information, and zero signaling no change in likeli-
hood of voting for or against the candidate. Of the four conditions in which respond-
ents were asked about their vote certainty, certainty is by far the highest when the 
information revealed is disappointing and in response to the first request (two-tailed 
Fig. 4  Evidence for a ‘deal–breaker’ heuristic. Each point above reports the mean vote certainty of the 
respondents for each experimental condition with 95% confidence intervals. The number of observations 
in each row, from top to bottom, is 929, 937, 892, and 918, for a total of 3675 observations. The deal-
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t test of difference of means, p < 0.001).17 This suggests that voters efficiently elimi-
nate unacceptable candidates from the pool. We find a smaller but still significant 
increase in certainty when the first information requested is encouraging compared 
to the third information requested (p < 0.01). These findings hold regardless of the 
respondent’s sophistication or education (see SI Sect. 4.1). However, they appear to 
be weaker for lower-level offices, such as clerk, comptroller, and judge, than they are 
for higher-level offices such as mayor, governor, and president (see SI Sect. 4.3); this 
may either be due to the smaller sample size for the lower-level offices, or because 
voters hold fewer deal-breaker stances about low-salience offices. In sum, voters pri-
oritize searches that help them winnow the field most efficiently, especially when 
they perceive the race to be important.
Discussion
Our findings provide both good and bad news about the American electorate’s 
capacity to identify the most qualified candidates. On one hand, people seek out 
information in an order that helps them eliminate less preferable candidates as 
quickly as possible, and thus appear to search for information in a rational and cost-
effective manner. Moreover, the information voters report seeking is heavily pro-
grammatic, and therefore hopefully conducive to the pursuit of quality substantive 
representation. The visible changes in search content across types of political offices 
suggest that people do take into account contextual relevance when searching for 
information.
On the other hand, the quality of search content voters use depends greatly on 
their level of education and/or political knowledge. Many citizens appear comfort-
able basing their decisions on information gleaned from unverifiable, irrelevant, and 
vague searches, especially for less-known local offices; less-knowledgeable citizens 
are also less likely to report needing more information to make a decision in the first 
place. The content of the searches, while encouraging, surely reflects social desira-
bility bias, and the sample itself over-represents the well-educated; both suggest that 
we may be overestimating the proportion of high-quality information searches in the 
full population. These results may thus paint a more optimistic view of sophisticated 
voters than is warranted if these respondents are also those most likely to know 
which answers will be viewed as socially desirable. However, less knowledgeable 
voters were also much more likely to rely on personalistic considerations in their 
searches. This raises new concerns about the personalization of American politics, 
not just at the highest levels of office, but throughout the system, perhaps as a func-
tion of voters’ “overwhelm” with the variety of potentially obscure offices on which 
they are asked to adjudicate.
We recognize the limitations of this study. One important difference between this 
project and much of the literature on voter behavior is that information search, rather 
than vote choice between two candidates, is the dependent variable of interest. Thus, 
17 We show that the findings hold within each individual study in SI Sect. 4.2.
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the study cannot speak to questions about which candidate voters would select. The 
design also faces external validity issues, as respondents are asked to self-report, 
rather than actually conduct real searches. Still, we feel the exercise is closer to real-
ity than one might think. For many people, the first time they encounter the candi-
dates of a local race will be when they see them listed on the ballot. Respondents 
could easily offer careless or inappropriate answers, and some did, biasing our study 
against finding any effects. That we still see large differences in response to informa-
tion requested earlier versus later suggests many respondents took the assignment 
seriously. If people are willing to engage in a rational information search for a mat-
ter of little consequence, we think it is likely that they would apply similar or greater 
effort under more meaningful voting conditions. Finally, while we recognize the 
limitations of convenience samples, we also note that respondents on Mechanical 
Turk tend to be regarded as unrepresentative in part because they are young, tech-
savvy, and politically knowledgeable; to the extent that voters in real life are less 
knowledgeable than Turkers, our results would lead us to expect lower-quality (less 
relevant, less verifiable, and less specific) searches to be more prevalent than we 
estimate, rather than less.
Given the dearth of scholarship (either theoretical or empirical) on both the infor-
mation search and voting behavior in subnational races, this study is also necessarily 
exploratory. As such, we attempt to describe variation and provide a rich context for 
future scholarship to adapt and explore in more detail, building our understanding 
of these phenomena going forward. It is possible, for instance, that there are more 
criteria of “good” searches than the three we propose here. Likewise, future research 
may find other factors, such as voters’ propensity to “roll-off” ballots in local elec-
tions, are related to office type or voter knowledge in important ways. Still other 
research might find that observational search data looks more or less concerning 
than the experimental data we present here. As an exploratory study, future schol-
arship will almost certainly prove some of these estimates wrong and some of our 
concerns misguided.
Still, based on these findings, we worry that ineffective search strategies are prev-
alent, and diminish citizens’ ability to obtain good representation. When voters base 
their decisions on unverifiable, vague, or irrelevant information, they open them-
selves to potential manipulation, particularly when that information may be provided 
by the candidate themselves or a fake news source. Furthermore, as many citizens 
had a tendency to ask about irrelevant policies for offices like clerk and comptrol-
ler, there is a danger that voters will eliminate highly qualified candidates simply 
because of candidates’ stances on issues that have little relevance for the office they 
hope to hold. Research does suggest that voters’ search behavior predicts election 
outcomes: a study using real Google search trends data, for instance, shows that 
Obama received fewer votes in 2012 in states where searches using racist language 
increased, even after controlling for his performance in 2008 (Stephens-Davidowitz 
2014).
Given our findings, we think developers of popular search engines like Google 
and Bing would do well to consider the impact of their algorithms on voter decision-
making. Confused by some obscure local race, many voters’ first impulse will be 
to reach for their smartphone rather than their voting guide, should they be lucky 
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enough to receive one. Searching the candidates’ names, along with any number of 
criteria, is far from guaranteed to result in the receipt of any actual useful informa-
tion. This scenario could be improved if search engine developers used a list of pub-
lic candidates for office to prioritize information from websites that stress accuracy 
and emphasize relevant considerations, like Ballotpedia. Ideally, Google could make 
use of its profile feature that provides a quick set of summary information on the 
search results screen itself. Such a service would be consistent with current efforts 
by companies in Silicon Valley to become more civically engaged, and help voters 
in the twenty-first century to navigate a busy and confusing political landscape.
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